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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/07/2011 Accident number: 760 
Accident time: 11:55 Accident Date: 06/05/2009 
Where it occurred: AF/0308/01635/[Demin
ing group]-MF 027, 
Jan Qadam, Qala-e-
Ahmad Khan Village, 
Bagram district 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 14/06/2009 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN-2 AP blast Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 15/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
use of shovel (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons 
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
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being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more 
information becomes available. 
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
File date: 14th June 2009 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT-03 DEMINING ACCIDENT 
INTRODUCTION: 
An investigation team was convened by the AMAC Central region to investigate the de-mining 
accident involving [the Victim] the De-miner of [Demining group] DT-03. The accident 
occurred at 11:55 hours on 06 May 2009 at minefield number AF/0308/01635/[Demining 
group]-MF 027, located in Jan Qadam area of Qala-e-Ahmad Khan village, Bagram district of 
province.                                                                                            
SUMMARY: 
Minefield # AF/0308/01635/[Demining group]-MF027 is an anti-personnel contaminated site 
around Bagram Airbase. A mine belt was established by Russian forces in order to secure the 
Airbase from the attacks of Mujahedeen. [Demining group] has been sub-contracted by 
coalition forces to clear certain tasks around Bagram Airbase. MF # 027 is one of the 
contracted tasks to be cleared by [Demining group]. On 06th of May 2009 around 11:55 hrs 
[the Victim] the deminer of DT-03 was busy in excavation of a detected signal, his excavation 
tool touched a PMN2 mine and caused it to explode. As a result the deminer got some 
injuries on his neck.  
According to the investigation report and as seems from the pictures of scene, the deminer 
was working with a big shovel. On 19th of April 09 one of the MACCA operations assistant 
found the team using big shovel and raised a non-conformity report, but the team leader and 
then the operations officer of [Demining group] did not accept the non-conformity report. 
However the problem was showed to be solved during the re-audit visits, but in reality it had 
not been solved and consequently the accident occurred.  
CONCLUSIONS: 
Obvious negligence of [Demining group] team from adherence to SOP and inattention of their 
operations department with regard to the use of non standard tools caused the accident to 
occur.   
RECOMMENDATIONS:  
The [Demining group] operations department should take necessary action in order to stop 
using big shovels during the excavation.  
MACCA expectation from [Demining group] management is to come up with a management 
solution to this problem and present their plan of action, for preventing recurrence of such 




Victim number: 948 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Not recorded 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: minor Neck 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. ". . some injuries on his neck". 
 
Analysis 
The primary and cause of this accident is listed as a Management Control Inadequacy 
because the international demining group’s Operations Manager refused to stop using a tool 
that the National Mine Action Authority maintained was dangerous, and seems to have 
compounded this error by trying to pretend otherwise. The secondary cause is listed as 
Inadequate equipment because the tool was not fit for purpose. [It is possible to expose a 
mine cautiously with a large shovel (see the excavation analysis in the GICHD Manual 
Demining Study) but only if it is used in the right way during area excavation, not metal-
detector signal investigation.]  
Neck injury is unusual, but so is using a shovel to expose a metal-detector reading. The 
investigators failed to record the PPE in use, which should have included (in Afghanistan at 
this time) a visor and frontal body protection that overlapped with the visor, so making neck 
injury hard to explain. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report: the summary provided does not list the PPE used, injuries or MEDEVAC details, and 
so is inadequate. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make Board of Inquiry reports 
widely available for some years, so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy 
that the Afghan national staff have been more responsible over this than those internationals 
who presume greater responsibility. 
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